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Summary
Since the end of the Cold War, both NATO and the European Union (EU) have
evolved along with Europe’s changed strategic landscape.  While NATO’s collective
defense guarantee remains at the core of the alliance, members have also sought to
redefine its mission as new security challenges have emerged on Europe’s periphery
and beyond.  At the same time, EU members have taken steps toward political
integration with decisions to develop a common foreign policy and a defense arm to
improve EU member states’ abilities to manage security crises, such as those that
engulfed the Balkans in the 1990s.
The evolution of NATO and the EU, however, has generated some friction
between the United States and several of its allies over the security responsibilities
of the two organizations.  U.S.-European differences center around threat assessment,
defense institutions, and military capabilities.  Successive U.S. administrations and
the U.S. Congress have called for enhanced European defense capabilities to enable
the allies to better share the security burden, and to ensure that NATO’s post-Cold
War mission embraces combating terrorism and countering the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.  U.S. policymakers, backed by Congress, support EU
efforts to develop a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) provided that it
remains tied to NATO and does not threaten the transatlantic relationship.
Most EU member states support close NATO-EU links, but also view ESDP as
a means to give themselves more options for dealing with future crises, especially in
cases in which the United States may be reluctant to become involved.  A minority
of EU countries, spearheaded by France, continue to favor a more autonomous EU
defense identity.  This desire has been fueled further recently by disputes with the
United States over how or whether to engage international institutions, such as the
United Nations, on security matters and over the weight given to political versus
military instruments in resolving international crises.
This report addresses several questions central to the debate over European
security and the future of the broader transatlantic relationship.  These include What
are the specific security missions of NATO and the European Union, and what is the
appropriate relationship between the two organizations?  What types of military
forces are necessary for NATO’s role in collective defense, and for the EU’s role in
crisis management?  Are NATO and EU decision-making structures and procedures
appropriate and compatible to ensure that there is an adequate and timely response
to emerging threats?  What is the proper balance between political and military tools
for defending Europe and the United States from terrorism and weapons
proliferation?
This report will be updated as events warrant.  For more information, see CRS
Report RS21864, The NATO Summit at Istanbul, 2004, by Paul Gallis, and CRS
Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers, by Kristin Archick.
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NATO and the European Union
Background
Both NATO and the European Community (EC), now the European Union
(EU), had their origins in post-World War II efforts to bring stability to Europe.
NATO’s original purpose was to provide collective defense through a mutual security
guarantee for the United States and its European allies to counterbalance potential
threats from the Soviet Union.  The European Community’s purpose was to provide
political stability to its members through securing democracy and free markets.
Congress and successive Administrations have strongly supported both NATO and
the EC/EU, based on the belief that stability in Europe has engendered the growth of
democracy, reliable military allies, and strong trading partners.
In the second session of the 109th Congress, Members will likely exhibit an
interest in NATO’s effort to develop more mobile combat forces, enhance the
alliance’s role in Afghanistan, further the training of Iraqi security forces, and reduce
the U.S. troop presence in Europe.  As in the previous several years, the evolution of
the NATO-EU relationship is also likely to attract congressional attention.
Evolution of NATO and the EC/EU after the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991 has brought with it some friction between the United States and several of its
allies over the security responsibilities of the two organizations.  These differences
center around threat assessment, defense institutions, and military capabilities.
European NATO allies that were also members of the EC/EU have sought from
1990 to build a security apparatus able to respond to developments believed to
threaten specifically the interests of Europe.  In 1990, after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait,
some European governments — led by France — concluded that they lacked the
military capabilities to respond beyond the North Atlantic Treaty area to distant
threats.  In consultation with the United States, they sought to establish the European
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO, in which they would consult
among themselves and with NATO over response to a threat.  Both the first Bush
Administration and the Clinton Administration asked that ESDI not duplicate NATO
structures, such as headquarters and a planning staff, but rather “borrow” NATO
structures for planning and carrying out operations.  Initial reluctance of the Clinton
Administration to involve the United States in the emerging conflicts accompanying
the break up of Yugoslavia led some allies to redouble their efforts to enhance their
political consultation, unity, and military capabilities.  They saw a threat in the form
of large refugee flows, autocratic regimes, and the spread of nationalist ideas
emanating from the conflict-ridden Balkans.
CRS-2
1 For a detailed examination of ESDI and ESDP up to 2000, see CRS Report RL30538,
European Security: The Debate in NATO and the European Union, by Karen Donfried and
Paul Gallis.
2 Executive Amendment no. 2310, Congressional Record, Apr. 27, 1998, p. S3657.
In 1994-1996, NATO endorsed steps to build an ESDI that was “separable but
not separate” from NATO to give the European allies the ability to act in crises where
NATO as a whole was not engaged.
In 1998-1999, the EU largely adopted ESDI as its own and began to transform
it into a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), given greater definition by
more detailed arrangements for the Europeans to borrow NATO assets for the
“Petersberg tasks” (crisis management, peace operations, search and rescue, and
humanitarian assistance).  Britain, in a major policy reversal, joined France in
moving forward discussions of these new arrangements within the EU. ESDP’s
principal differences with ESDI were in the effort to secure more independence from
NATO tutelage and guidance in the event that the United States expressed reluctance
to become involved in a crisis, a renewed discussion of more carefully outlined EU
decision-making structures, and consideration of forces appropriate for potential
crises.  The Kosovo conflict of 1999 further spurred this effort, when most EU
members of NATO conceded that they still lacked adequately mobile and sustainable
forces for crisis management.  All EU members express a wish to see a strong U.S.-
led NATO.  However, there are disputes with the United States over how or whether
to involve international institutions, such as the UN, in international crises.  There
are also disagreements over the weight given to political versus military instruments
in resolving these crises.  These disputes have fueled European desires to develop a
more independent ESDP.1  The United States maintains that ESDP must be closely
tied to NATO, given the large number of states that belong to both NATO and the
EU (see membership chart in Appendix) and limited European defense resources.
Congress is actively engaged in the evolving NATO-EU relationship.  While
Congress has supported the greater political integration that marked the European
Community’s evolution into the European Union, many Members have called for
improved European military capabilities to share the security burden, and to ensure
that NATO’s post-Cold War mission embraces combating terrorism and WMD
proliferation.  In 1998 and again in 2003 the Senate approved the addition of new
members to the alliance as a means to build European stability through securing
democratic governments and adding states that shared concerns over emerging
threats.  
During the 1998 NATO enlargement debate, Senator Jon Kyl offered an
amendment to the instrument of ratification that described terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as new threats that NATO must
counter.  The Kyl amendment called on the European allies to develop capabilities
“to project power... and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of willing partners....”
Member states should “possess national military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces
over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate
jointly with the United States in high intensity conflict.”2  The amendment passed by
a wide margin.  Its essence was apparent in NATO’s Strategic Concept, the alliance’s
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strategic guidelines, adopted at the Washington summit in April 1999, and in
subsequent NATO agreements to redefine the alliance’s mission and to improve
capabilities.
The issues raised in the 1990s debate over European security remain the essence
of the debate today.  What are the missions in security affairs of NATO and the
European Union?  What is the proper weight to be given to political and military
instruments in defending Europe and the United States from terrorism and
proliferation?  What types of military forces are necessary for NATO’s role in
collective defense, and for the EU’s role in crisis management?  Are NATO and EU
decision-making structures and procedures appropriate and compatible to ensure that
there is an adequate and timely response to emerging threats?  What should be the
role of other international institutions in responding to these threats?  Issues raised
by these questions are the subject of this report.
NATO’s Mission and Response to Threats
There is a consensus in NATO that terrorism and the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction are the principal threats facing the allies today.  NATO’s 1999
Strategic Concept states that the allied “defense posture must have the capability to
address appropriately and effectively the risks” associated with the proliferation of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.  The document also describes terrorism
as a threat, but indicates that political and diplomatic means should be the main
instruments against both terrorism and proliferation.  The attacks of September 11,
2001, on the United States led to a refinement of the allied posture on these threats.
In a May 2002 communiqué, NATO agreed that the allies must “be able to field
forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over
distance and time, and achieve their objectives.” The communiqué marks the moment
that NATO decided to assume responsibilities around the globe should an ally be
threatened.
In November 2002, at the Prague summit, the allies made a commitment to
build the capabilities necessary to go out of area.  They agreed to establish a NATO
Response Force (NRF) of 20,000 troops for rapid “insertion” into a theater of
operations.  The NRF consists of highly trained combat units from member states,
and could be used to fight terrorism.  In addition, the allies agreed to a scaled-down
list of new capabilities, called the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), that
declining European defense budgets might be able to sustain.  Under the PCC, some
allies have agreed to develop consortia to fund jointly such systems as strategic airlift
and aerial refueling, meant to provide mobility for combat operations distant from
Europe, or specialized “niche” capabilities, such as special forces or units to detect
chemical or biological agents.3
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U.S.-European Differences over Threat Response
Despite the transatlantic agreement on the new common threats, the NRF, and
the PCC, there are significant differences between the United States and its allies
over appropriate responses.  Most allied governments contend that the
Administration places excessive emphasis on military over political means to counter
a threat, and that the allies have other domestic budget priorities (such as pension
plans) that compete with allocations for defense.
The allies’ response to the Bush Administration’s doctrine of “pre-emptive
attack” in the face of an imminent threat captures elements of the transatlantic debate
over response to the threat.  The Administration’s National Security Strategy (2002)
notes that the United States reserves the right to take military action “to forestall or
prevent... hostile acts” by an adversary.  While most allies would concede such a
right, some view the doctrine as an example of U.S. unilateralism at the moment of
U.S. global military pre-eminence.  In general, they believe that military action must
be undertaken within a multilateral framework.
The allied debate over pre-emptive attack was affected by the U.S. decision to
terminate UN weapons inspections and to go to war against Iraq in March 2003, a
conflict Administration officials indicate was undertaken to prevent the Hussein
regime from developing and using weapons of mass destruction against the United
States and other countries.  The initial refusal by France, Germany, and Belgium to
approve NATO military assistance to Turkey in February 2003 in anticipation of a
possible attack by Iraq sharply divided the alliance.  The three allies contended that
such assistance would amount to tacit approval of a U.S. belief that war with Iraq was
necessary.  Most allies said then, and maintain now, that a UN resolution is a
requisite step, whenever possible, for NATO military action.  The inability of the
Bush Administration to locate WMD in Iraq has led to renewed insistence among the
European allies that their opposition was correct and that a UN imprimatur should
be sought for NATO operations.4
Allied insistence on involvement of international institutions in “legitimizing”
conflict has its origins in the aftermath of the 20th century’s two world wars.
Europeans remain wary of arguments justifying the crossing of borders and resorting
to military action.  Establishment of the United Nations in 1946, under U.S.
leadership, was one means to ensure that international diplomatic and public opinion
could be brought to bear to enhance understanding of an impending danger and how
to respond to it.  The North Atlantic Treaty’s (1949) reliance on the consensus
method of decision-making was another.
The allied debate over pre-emptive attack, out-of-area engagement, and
“legitimization” of military operations has been brought to a head by the Bush
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Administration’s frustration with cumbersome alliance decision-making procedures.
The Administration believes that NATO military actions should mostly be conducted
by “coalitions of the willing.”  In this view, the allies, of which only a small number
have deployable forces capable of high-intensity conflict, should use coalitions of
member states that agree upon a threat and have the means to counter it.  Most
European allies believe that “coalitions of the willing” would undermine the
solidarity of the alliance and the consensus decision-making principle.  Their support
for the principle of consensus centers upon a desire to maintain political solidarity
for controversial measures.  In this view, the consent of 19 sovereign governments,
each taking an independent decision to work with other governments, is a formidable
expression of solidarity and in itself provides a measure of legitimization for an
operation.  Some allies believe that this view was given weight, for example, in
NATO’s decision to go to war against Serbia in 1999 when Russian resistance
prevented passage of a UN Security Council resolution approving intervention on
behalf of Kosovo.5
In 2005, former German Chancellor Schroeder proposed a stronger role for the
EU in international political affairs.  He said that NATO is “no longer the primary
venue where trans-Atlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies.”  He suggested
that such issues as Iran’s nuclear program and European weapons sales to China
should be discussed with the United States in the European Union.  Some European
officials add the Arab-Israeli conflict to this list.  More quietly, the French
government is pursuing the same perspective.  The Bush Administration had for
some time resisted discussing such issues at NATO.  Its sentiment has changed on
this point in the past year, as NATO meetings in December 2005 saw a discussion
of such issues as the greater Middle East and the alliance’s relations with other
international organizations.6
Capabilities and “Usability”
Most allies lack mobile forces that can be sustained distant from the European
theater.7 In October 2003, former NATO Secretary General George Robertson said
that “out of the 1.4 million soldiers under arms, the 18 non-U.S. allies have 55,000
deployed on multinational operations..., yet they feel overstretched.  If operations
such as the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan are to succeed, we
must generate more usable soldiers and have the political will to deploy more of them
in multinational operations.” NATO Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR)
General James Jones told Congress in March 2004 that only 3%-4% of European
forces are “expeditionarily deployable.”8  The Bush Administration proposed both
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the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the Prague Capabilities Commitment in 2002
to help remedy this problem.  The purpose of the initiatives is to create forces that
integrate, for example, aerial refuelers and airlift capacities that would allow troops
and equipment to be moved to a conflict.  The allies believe that shared funding of
some of these capabilities will moderate the costs to individual governments.
The NRF now has 17,000 troops; General Jones has declared that it reached an
“initial operational capability” in October 2004, and is the “engine for NATO
transformation.”  Small contingents of the NRF were quietly deployed for securing
the Olympics in Greece in August 2004, and two months later in Afghanistan during
the presidential elections there.9 The NRF has also been used for humanitarian
assistance in Pakistan since the 2005 earthquakes there.  It is expected to reach a full
capability with over 20,000 troops by summer 2006. Although most of the NRF’s
contingents are European, the United States has begun contributing some troops.
General Jones has pressed an idea that more NATO assets be funded jointly to
ensure availability of needed equipment and forces.  Today, NATO for the most part
follows the concept of  “costs lie where they fall,” meaning that governments pay the
costs for forces they send to an operation, such as in Kosovo in 1999.  Such a practice
translates into the larger countries with more military capabilities and political will
bearing disproportionate costs in providing security for all.  General Jones is urging
that more assets, as is already the case with AWACS, be funded jointly.  Otherwise,
he believes that NATO risks failing to develop appropriate forces, such as the NRF,
as governments decline to contribute troops because they might be used for
expensive operations.10
The NRF is thus far generally regarded as a success, but the second Prague
initiative has been a different affair.  The Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) is
a slimmed-down version of an earlier capabilities initiative and has eight capability
goals targeting the allies’ principal deficiencies.
The list of PCC capabilities includes strategic lift (air and sea), aerial refueling,
precision-guided munitions, secure communications, ground surveillance systems,
and special forces.  At the Istanbul summit in June 2004, NATO announced that a
Chemical/Biological, Radiological, and nuclear defense battalion had become fully
operational, fulfilling one of the capability goals.  There has been some progress in
purchase or leasing of sea lift, and the acquisition of precision-guided munitions is
on schedule.  While some U.S. officials say that the PCC is on schedule, others say
that there remain serious shortfalls in aerial refuelers and air lift, where PCC goals
are unlikely to be met in the foreseeable future.11
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The allies designed the capabilities list to form an integrated set of systems;
because allies are not acquiring some systems, other systems’ effectiveness will be
diminished.  For example, improved lift capacity is necessary if equipment,
munitions, and forces are to reach a theater of operations in a timely fashion.  Some
governments, such as the German government, have pleaded that competing budget
necessities, such as pension programs, are forestalling plans to modernize their
militaries.  The German parliament has also reduced and capped defense
expenditures for the next several years.12
The United States is in the early stages of altering the nature of its troop
deployments in NATO Europe.  The Department of Defense is considering reducing
the number of U.S. troops in Germany, and placing part of those troops at small bases
in Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania in 2007-2008.  U.S. troops would fall from the
current figure of 71,000 to 42,000. The new bases would be barebones, with
equipment dispersed around NATO Europe.  Under the proposed plan, U.S. forces
would be lighter and more mobile, and able to move quickly to new trouble spots.
It remains unclear whether the United States would pay for the modernization or
development of sites that might become new bases, or whether central European
countries would be expected to bear part of the burden.13
Some analysts worry that NATO and the EU might “compete” for the use of
more mobile, high-readiness forces. The EU is developing its own rapid reaction
forces for crisis management.  Some of these units are “double hatted” for use either
by the EU or by NATO.  The EU also has embarked on an initiative to enhance its
military capabilities and equipment procurement, including, for example, greater
strategic lift and weapons for suppression of enemy air defenses.  The issue of which
organization, NATO or the EU, could use national forces if there were simultaneous
crises has not been resolved.
General Jones believes that the EU places more restrictions on use of its forces
than does NATO, and that these restrictions are reflected in the training of those
forces.  In his view, NATO and the EU train their forces to different standards, and
EU forces have a different “language” of command and operations; these hurdles
must be cleared for forces trained for the EU to be useful to NATO.14
“National Caveats”
General Jones has been increasingly critical of NATO governments that commit
forces to an allied mission, then impose restrictions on tasks those forces may
undertake.  Such “national caveats” have troubled operations in the Balkans, for
example.  In March 2004, when Albanians rioted against Serbs in Kosovo (see
below), German troops refused orders to join other elements of KFOR in crowd
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control; only 6,000 of KFOR’s 18,000 troops were eligible to use force against the
rioting crowds.  NATO is attempting to overcome this problem by providing more
riot-control training for troops designated for assignment in Kosovo.
Other problems are evident as well.  When some NATO governments vote in
the North Atlantic Council to support a politically sensitive operation, those same
governments sometimes tell their officers who are within NATO’s integrated
command structure (and therefore technically not under national control) not to
participate in carrying out the operation, a step General Jones has described as highly
disruptive of operations.  Allied officials point to Germany as the principal culprit.15
At the same time, national caveats are an expression of sovereignty by member
governments and on occasion may be the price that must be paid to secure the
participation of a government in a NATO mission.  “National caveats” is a political
term and not an official NATO description of restrictions on forces.  The United
States has taken the lead in criticizing governments that place caveats on their forces.
However, some U.S. military officials say that some allies might also contend that
the United States has its own caveats but that Washington chooses to call them by
another name.  For example, the United States, as do other governments, places
restrictions on the range of actions that its forces may undertake in the Balkans and
Afghanistan, but describes these restrictions as tactical rules of engagement.16
In general, however, U.S. military officials oppose national caveats because they
complicate the force-planning process.  With caveats in place, force planners must
cajole member states to supply troops who have the authority and skills to
accomplish a mission.  These officials add that knowledgeable commanders on the
ground know what forces under their command may or may not do and implement
a mission accordingly.
Multinational Deployments
Bosnia. NATO has had peacekeepers in Bosnia since 1995.  The initial
Stabilization Force (SFOR) there numbered 60,000.  As Bosnia has stabilized,
NATO reduced the force.  In December 2004, the EU took over stabilization
operations in Bosnia.
Afghanistan.  NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has said that
the stabilization of Afghanistan is the alliance’s primary mission.  In 2006, NATO
intends to expand its mission there. There are two military operations in Afghanistan.
NATO leads the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); its mission is to
bring stability to Afghanistan.  The United States leads a separate, non-NATO
mission, called Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); its mission is to eliminate
Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants, primarily active in the eastern part of the country.
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NATO governments have decided to bring these two missions closer together,
although their commands and mission will remain separate.
ISAF now has 9,000 troops; overwhelmingly, the forces are from NATO’s
member states, above all from Germany, Canada, Britain, and France. U.S. forces in
ISAF are minimal.  ISAF provides security for Kabul and several outlying regions,
and is a stabilization force not geared for combat operations. 
NATO wishes to extend ISAF’s reach in Afghanistan.  Warlords are re-exerting
authority in parts of the country.  ISAF is establishing Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs), composed of soldiers and civil affairs officers, in parts of
Afghanistan.  The objective of the PRTs is to extend the authority of the central
government, provide security, and undertake projects (such as infrastructure
development) that would boost the Afghan economy.  This effort has met with only
mixed success, in part because allied governments have been slow to sponsor PRTs
and to provide troops for them, in part because some allies lack deployable,
sustainable forces. A key element lacking in some PRTs is quick-response combat
and medical units that could assist PRTs that find themselves in danger.
In summer 2006, ISAF intends to extend its authority over southern
Afghanistan, still troubled by occasional violence stirred up by Taliban and Al Qaeda
forces.  ISAF also intends to expand its troop numbers to 15,000.  Some allies have
resisted moving ISAF into physical and policy territory that may bring the soldiers
into counter-insurgency operations.  They believe that the 2004 Abu Ghraib prison
scandal in Iraq has tainted U.S. leadership of counter-insurgency/anti-terror
operations and that European populations are wary of associating their forces with
those of the United States in such operations.  Because the “rules of the road” in
fighting terrorism are not agreed upon in the alliance, some governments are reluctant
to participate in a mission led by the United States.  The ISAF and OEF missions will
remain distinct, therefore, with an overall commander that will ensure coordination.
For example, should some aircraft assigned to one mission be necessary in an
emergency for the other mission, the commander may take steps to move assets to
the appropriate place.17
The allies are struggling to combat Afghanistan’s growing poppy crop.
Afghanistan supplies 87% of the world’s opium, which accounts for an estimated
60% of the country’s GDP. The crop therefore is a major factor in the economic life
and stability of the country. The United States and the allies are debating means to
eliminate opium production. Measures being considered range from finding viable
replacement crops to developing more “eco-tourism” in the long term. The allies
believe that the Afghan government must take the lead in reducing the poppy crop,
as only Afghan leaders can have long-term credibility in the country. Afghanistan’s
weak institutions, including minimally functional military, police, and judicial
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systems, retard any significant progress, as does the virtual absence of a market
infrastructure that could support a modernizing economy.18
Operation Enduring Freedom has approximately 18,000 troops.  Most Enduring
Freedom forces are from the United States, but France, Norway, Italy, and several
other allies also provide special forces for combat operations.
Iraq.  The U.S. invasion of Iraq and subsequent efforts to stabilize that country
have caused great controversy in the alliance.  From at least early 2002, some allies,
particularly France and Germany, were contending that the principal threats to the
allies lay elsewhere, in the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, and from
instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan.  They contended that Iraq could be contained
through sanctions and, after the fall of 2002, U.N. WMD inspections.19
Transatlantic differences over Iraq touched off a bitter dispute in NATO in
February 2003, shortly before the war, when France, Germany, and Belgium blocked
initial U.S. efforts to provide NATO defensive assistance to Turkey.  They argued
that such assistance would be tantamount to acknowledgment that war was necessary
and imminent at a time when U.N. inspections were still underway.  The Iraq conflict
and ensuing failure to locate WMD sharpened a debate among the allies over an
appropriate NATO role in Iraq, and Iraq’s effect on allied interests.
The Administration contends that stabilization of Iraq is in the interest of all
allies.  The insurgency and general disorder in much of Iraq has opened the door to
a terrorist foothold in the country.  Administration officials believe that anchoring
democratic institutions in Iraq will have a positive, reverberative effect on Middle
Eastern governments that have authoritarian traditions.20
Many allies, led by France and Germany, recognize that an unstable Iraq is an
unsettling force in the already volatile Middle East.  However, they believe that the
Arab-Israeli conflict must first be settled before there can be stability in the region,
and that U.S. policy favors Israel excessively and is thus an impediment to peace.21
They are skeptical that an outside power like the United States can develop
democracy in Iraq, a country that has sectarian and tribal divisions and no rooted
legacy of representative government.  They also believe that the U.N. should have a
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larger role in Iraq.  French President Chirac said before the Iraq war that a U.S.
invasion of Iraq would lead to the growth and spread of anti-Western terrorism.22
The Bush Administration has gained a measure of NATO involvement in Iraq.
NATO has also agreed to a training mission for Iraqi security forces.  At the Istanbul
summit in June 2004, the allies agreed in principle to train elements of Iraq’s army,
police, and national guard.
The trainers’ precise mission and their command structure were paramount in
the allies’ debate.  France, Germany, and Belgium did not want the training mission
to evolve into a combat mission.  They successfully insisted that the training site in
Iraq be clearly an Iraqi and not a U.S. installation.  Several allies also insisted that
training be open to all sectarian, ethnic, and tribal groups.  Finally, France, backed
by several other governments, wanted a U.S. general who heads training in Iraq to
lead the mission, and not the U.S. general commanding the Multinational Force  and
the Bush Administration’s choice for mission commander.  The French government
did not wish the training mission to be associated with the Multinational Force, the
heir of the force that fought the Iraq war. The French view prevailed.
The allies will send 300 trainers to Iraq; 165 were in place by November 2005.
France and Germany have offered bilateral training, not under a NATO flag, outside
Iraq for Iraqi police and other security forces.  At the same time, Paris and Berlin are
contributing money to the NATO training mission in Iraq. 
There are approximately 138,000 U.S. troops in Iraq.  Another 27,000 are being
contributed by other countries.  All of these troops are under the U.S.-led
Multinational Force (MNF), which is not under NATO auspices.  Except for Britain
(12,000), Italy (3,030), and Poland (1,500), these contingents are small.
Deployments to Iraq are highly unpopular in most European countries.23
Enlargement
On March 29, 2004, seven countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) became the newest members of NATO upon
submission of their instruments of ratification in a ceremony in Washington, D.C.
Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia are candidates for the next round of NATO
enlargement.
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U.S. Leadership under Challenge
The Bush Administration’s effort to shift NATO’s mission to combating
terrorism and proliferation, with a strategic center of gravity in the Middle East, has
led to uneasiness and a series of challenges by some allies.  While all allies view
terrorism and proliferation as serious threats, and all have embraced the need for
more “expeditionary” forces, several key allies nonetheless have questions about the
Administration’s leadership and its commitment to NATO.
International political considerations play an important role in some allies’
questioning of U.S. leadership.  Most allies are members of the European Union.
They place great importance on international institutions as a means of solving
transnational problems, from economic dislocation to narcotics trafficking to
prevention of conflict.  The legacy of two world wars in Europe remains a central
factor in shaping governments’ policies; prevention of illegitimate violations of
sovereignty was a principal reason for their support of the establishment of the UN,
the EU, and NATO.  This view lies behind the general European opposition to the
Bush Administration’s doctrine of “pre-emptive action.” Some European observers
today believe that there is an “absence of anything that could be called an
international security architecture,” in part because the United States, in this view,
avoids reliance on the UN.  U.S. global leadership was once “embedded in the
international rule of law that constrained the powerful as well as the weak.”
However, in this view, the U.S. resort to force in Iraq, without clear support from the
UN, has made the United States “a revolutionary hyperpower.”24
Some U.S. officials counter that there is good cooperation with the allies on the
use of law  enforcement to combat terrorism,25 but that there are moments when the
danger of impending catastrophic developments or an imminent attack justifies the
use of force without “legitimization” through the often time-consuming process of
obtaining a UN resolution.  The Clinton Administration (and ultimately all the allies)
reached this conclusion when it decided that NATO must act to prevent ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo without explicit U.N. authorization in light of a threatened
Russian veto, and the Bush Administration reached this conclusion when it went to
war in Iraq in the belief that the Hussein regime possessed a WMD arsenal.
The terrorist bombing in Madrid on March 11, 2004, which killed
approximately 200 people, led to severe repercussions for the Administration.
Approximately 90% of the Spanish population had opposed then Prime Minister
Aznar’s support for the invasion of Iraq, and his subsequent decision to send forces
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as part of the U.S.-led coalition.26  Spain held scheduled elections three days after the
bombing.  Voters turned out the sitting government and elected a Socialist-led
coalition.  Some analysts attribute this result to the belief among some voters that the
government’s Iraq policy invited the terrorist attack.  Others assert that the perception
among many voters that the Aznar government badly mishandled the bombing
aftermath — by sticking to claims that the Basque terrorist group ETA was behind
the attacks in the face of mounting evidence of an Al Qaeda link — was a key factor
in the election’s outcome. The Socialists have sharply criticized U.S. Iraq policy.
Socialist Prime Minister José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero accused President Bush and
British Prime Minister Blair of “lies” over leading a coalition to war on the basis of
inaccurate intelligence information.  Zapatero has withdrawn Spanish troops from
Iraq.27
Some allies contend that the United States is seeking to use NATO as a
“toolbox.”  They object to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s repeated advocacy of
“coalitions of the willing” to fight in conflicts as a means of using allied resources
and supportive NATO governments to endorse U.S. interventions on foreign soil.
They argue that the Administration’s contention that “the mission drives the
coalition” undermines allied solidarity; such a doctrine weakens the long-held view
that all member states must believe that they have a stake in allied security
operations.
Most allies have been critical of Secretary Rumsfeld’s division of Europe into
“old” and “new,” a formulation that chastised the former (such as France and
Germany) for having opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq and lauded the latter (such
as Spain under Aznar, Poland and the Baltic states) for having supported it. The
criticism has come, quietly, even from countries such as Poland because Warsaw
objects to any division of the continent.  Central European governments view both
NATO and the EU as means to unite the continent and to promote stability, and
object to any attempts to divide the Europeans.28
Some allies believe that the United States relies too heavily upon military power
to resolve issues that may have a political solution.  They place the issue of
proliferation in this realm, and cite the long-term economic pressure of sanctions
against Libya, followed by U.S. and British negotiations with Tripoli, as evidence
that a patient policy based on political initiatives can be effective.29
At the same time, all allies underscore the importance of their strategic
relationship with the United States.  While the European Union, including its nascent
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defense entities, is of great value to them, they nonetheless contend that the
transatlantic partnership remains vital to countering global threats.
A New Security Actor:  The European Union
For decades, there has been discussion within the EU about creating a common
security and defense policy.  Previous EU efforts to forge a defense arm foundered
on member states’ national sovereignty concerns and fears that an EU defense
capability would undermine NATO and the transatlantic relationship.  However, U.S.
hesitancy in the early 1990s to intervene in the Balkan conflicts, and UK Prime
Minister Tony Blair’s desire to be a leader in Europe, prompted him in December
1998 to reverse Britain’s long-standing opposition to an EU defense arm.  Blair
joined French President Jacques Chirac in pressing the EU to develop a defense
identity outside of NATO.  This new British engagement, along with deficiencies in
European defense capabilities exposed by NATO’s 1999 Kosovo air campaign, gave
momentum to the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).30
EU leaders hope ESDP will provide a military backbone for the Union’s
evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a project aimed at furthering
EU political integration and boosting the EU’s weight in world affairs.  They also
hope that ESDP will give EU member states more options for dealing with future
crises.  The EU stresses that ESDP is not aimed at usurping NATO’s collective
defense role nor at weakening the transatlantic alliance.  
Most EU members, led by the UK, insist that ESDP be tied to NATO — as do
U.S. policymakers — and that EU efforts to build more robust defense capabilities
should reinforce those of the alliance.  At the NATO Washington Summit in April
1999, NATO welcomed the EU’s renewed commitment to strengthen its defense
capabilities, and acknowledged the EU’s resolve to develop an autonomous decision-
making capacity for military actions “where the Alliance as a whole is not
engaged.”31  Nevertheless, France and some other countries continue to favor a more
independent EU defense arm.  French officials have long argued that the EU should
seek to counterbalance the United States on the international stage and view ESDP
as a vehicle for enhancing the EU’s political credibility.
U.S. support for ESDP and for the use of NATO assets in EU-led operations has
been conditioned since 1998 on three “redlines,” known as the “three D’s:”
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! No decoupling from NATO.  ESDP must complement NATO and
not threaten the indivisibility of European and North American
security.
! No duplication of NATO command structures or alliance-wide
resources.
! No discrimination against European NATO countries that are not
members of the EU.  The non-EU NATO members were concerned
about being excluded from formulating and participating in the EU’s
ESDP, especially if they were going to be asked to approve
“lending” NATO assets to the EU.
ESDP’s Progress to Date
At its December 1999 Helsinki summit, the EU announced its “determination
to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole
is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to
international crises.”  At Helsinki, the EU decided to establish an institutional
decision-making framework for ESDP and a 60,000-strong “Headline Goal” rapid
reaction force to be fully operational by 2003.  This force would be deployable within
60 days for at least a year and capable of undertaking the full range of “Petersberg
tasks” (humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, peacekeeping, and peace
enforcement), but it would not be a standing “EU army.”  Rather, troops and assets
at appropriate readiness levels would be identified from existing national forces for
use by the EU.  In addition, EU leaders at Helsinki welcomed efforts to restructure
European defense industries, which they viewed as key to ensuring a European
industrial and technological base strong enough to support ESDP military
requirements.
The EU has also sought to bolster its civilian capacities for crisis management
in the context of ESDP.  In June 2000, the EU decided to establish a 5,000-strong
civilian police force, and in June 2001, the EU set targets for developing deployable
teams of experts in the rule of law, civilian administration, and civilian protection.
In December 2004, EU leaders reached agreement on a Civilian Headline Goal for
2008, which aims to further improve the EU’s civilian crisis management capabilities
by enabling the EU to respond more rapidly to emerging crises.
New Institutions and NATO-EU Links.  On the institutional side, the EU
has created three new defense decision-making bodies to help direct and implement
ESDP.  These are:  the Political and Security Committee (composed of senior
national representatives); the Military Committee (composed of member states’
Chiefs of Defense or their representatives in Brussels); and the Military Staff
(consisting of about 130 military experts seconded from member states).
The EU has also established cooperation mechanisms with NATO, intended to
enable the EU to use NATO assets and meet U.S. concerns about ESDP.  These
include regular NATO-EU meetings at ambassadorial and ministerial level, as well
as regular meetings between the EU and non-EU European NATO members.  This
framework allows for consultations to be intensified in the event of a crisis, and
permits non-EU NATO members to contribute to EU-led operations; the EU agreed
to establish ad hoc “committees of contributors” for EU-led missions to give non-EU
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participants a role in operational decision-making.  The NATO-EU link was
formalized in December 2002; this paved the way for the implementation in March
2003 of “Berlin Plus,” an arrangement allowing the EU to borrow Alliance assets and
capabilities for EU-led operations and thereby prevent a needless duplication of
NATO structures and wasteful expenditure of scarce European defense funds.
“Berlin Plus” gives the EU “assured access” to NATO operational planning
capabilities and “presumed access” to NATO common assets for EU-led operations
“in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.”32
The EU’s Rapid Reaction Force and Capability Challenges.
Enhancing European military capabilities has been and remains a key challenge for
the EU as it seeks to forge a credible ESDP.  As noted above, the 1999 NATO war
in Kosovo demonstrated serious deficiencies in European military assets and the
widening technology gap with U.S. forces.  European shortfalls in strategic airlift,
precision-guided munitions, command and control systems, intelligence, aerial
refueling, and suppression of enemy air defenses were among the most obvious.  In
setting out the parameters of the EU rapid reaction force, EU leaders sought to
establish goals that would require members to enhance force deployability and
sustainability, and to reorient and ultimately increase defense spending to help fill
equipment gaps.  The most ambitious members envisioned the EU’s rapid reaction
force developing a combat capability equivalent, for example, to NATO’s role in the
Kosovo conflict.
In 2000 and 2001, the EU held two military capability commitment conferences
to define national contributions to the rapid reaction force and address the capability
shortfalls.  Member states pledged in excess of 60,000 troops drawn from their
existing national forces, as well as up to 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels
as support elements.  In 2001, the EU also initiated a European Capability Action
Plan (ECAP) to devise strategies for remedying the capability gaps.  In May 2003,
the EU declared that the rapid reaction force possesses “operational capability across
the full range of Petersberg tasks,” but recognized that the force would still be
“limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls” in certain defense capabilities.33
As a result, ESDP missions in the near to medium term will likely focus on lower-
end Petersberg tasks rather than higher-end peace enforcement operations.  EU
officials maintain that enhancing European defense capabilities remains an ongoing,
long-term project.
Many military analysts assert that overall levels of European defense spending
are insufficient to fund all ESDP requirements.  European leaders are reluctant to ask
legislatures and publics for more money for defense given competing domestic
priorities and tight budgets.  In light of the dim prospects for increased defense
spending in the near term, EU officials emphasize that they do not need to match
U.S. defense capabilities exactly — which they view as increasingly impossible —
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and stress they can fill critical gaps by spending existing defense resources more
wisely.  EU leaders point out that rationalizing member states’ respective defense
efforts and promoting multinational projects to reduce internal operating costs have
been key goals of ECAP.  Some options under consideration in ECAP include leasing
commercial assets (primarily for air transport); sharing or pooling of national assets
among several member states; “niche” specialization, in which one or more member
state would assume responsibility for providing a particular capability; and more joint
procurement projects.  
In June 2004, EU leaders agreed to establish a European Defense Agency (EDA)
devoted to improving European military capabilities and interoperability.  A key
focus of the EDA will be to help the EU’s 25 member states to stretch their scarce
defense funds farther by increasing cooperation among members in the areas of
weapons research, development, and procurement.  In November 2005, EU defense
ministers agreed on a voluntary “code of conduct” to encourage cross-border
competition in the European defense equipment market.  Traditionally, EU member
states have tightly guarded their national defense markets; defense equipment
contracts have been largely exempt on national security grounds from normal EU
internal market rules that eliminate trade barriers.  The EU hopes that more
competition will lead to lower defense procurement costs, improved capabilities, and
increase the competitiveness of the European defense market globally.  The new code
of conduct will take effect in July 2006 for those countries that decide to take part.34
Critics, however, charge that promises to spend existing defense resources more
wisely have not yet materialized in any substantial way.  They doubt that EU member
states will be willing to make the hard political choices that could ultimately produce
more “bang for the euro” because these could infringe on national sovereignty.  For
example, they point out that “niche” specialization would require some member
states to forego building certain national capabilities, while proposals to pool assets
may require members to relinquish national controls.  
Some question how effective the EDA will be in promoting harmonization of
equipment purchases given that many member states remain wedded to fulfilling
national requirements and may be reluctant to expose their own defense industries
to competition from other European weapons producers.  Critics point out that the
new agreed code of conduct to liberalize the European defense markets will be
voluntary and, therefore, unenforceable.  Many expect that some European defense
ministries will also be slow to move away from their trusted national suppliers.
Skeptics also criticize European leaders’ continued devotion to the increasingly
expensive but still non-existent Airbus’s A400M military transport project, in which
seven European allies are investing large portions of their procurement budgets.
They argue that it would be cheaper and quicker for these countries to buy U.S.-built
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transporters such as the C-130 or C-17, but many European leaders resist this option
because European defense industries create European jobs.35
ESDP Missions.  Despite the capability challenges still facing European
militaries, the EU has sought to keep up momentum for ESDP.  The EU has launched
several civilian and military missions in the Balkans, an area long assumed by EU
observers to be the most likely destination of any EU-led operation.  In January 2003,
the EU’s civilian crisis management force took over U.N. police operations in Bosnia
as the first-ever ESDP mission.  With “Berlin Plus” arrangements finalized, the EU
launched in March 2003 its first military mission, Operation Concordia, that replaced
the small NATO peacekeeping mission in Macedonia.  Operation Concordia was
supported by NATO headquarters (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium and NATO
operational reserves already located in Macedonia.  In December 2003, Operation
Concordia ended, but the EU established a police mission to help train Macedonia’s
police forces.  In early December 2004, the EU took over the NATO-led
peacekeeping mission in Bosnia within the “Berlin Plus” framework.  The EU-led
Operation Althea of 7,000 troops constitutes the largest ESDP military mission to
date.  NATO retains a small headquarters presence in Sarajevo to assist with Bosnian
defense reforms, counterterrorism efforts, and the apprehension of war criminals.
Operation Althea is viewed as an important test for the evolving NATO-EU
relationship.36
The EU has also sought to play a role beyond the Balkans.  From June to
September 2003, the EU led an international peacekeeping force of 1,400 in the
Democratic Republic of Congo that sought to stop rebel fighting and protect aid
workers.  The Congo mission was requested by the United Nations and headed by
France in a “lead nation” capacity.  This mission came as a surprise to many EU
observers, NATO officials, and U.S. policymakers because it was geographically
farther afield than they had thought the EU would venture, and because it was
conducted without recourse to NATO assets.  The Congo operation was planned by
French military planners in national headquarters.  Some NATO and U.S. officials
were annoyed, asserting that the EU should have first formally asked NATO whether
it wished to undertake the Congo operation.  EU officials did consult with NATO
about the mission, but maintain they were not obliged to ask NATO for its
permission given that the EU was not requesting to use NATO assets.37
In December 2004, the EU announced it would deploy a modest police mission
to the Congo to assist in setting up a Congolese police unit.  This mission was
officially launched in late April 2005 following some logistical delays.  In June 2005,
the EU established another small mission to provide advice and assistance to
Congolese authorities on security sector reform.  Also in June 2005, the EU and
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NATO agreed to coordinate efforts to airlift African Union peacekeepers to Sudan
to help quell the ongoing violence in the Darfur region.
In 2005, the EU for the first time launched several small civilian ESDP missions
in Asia and the Middle East.  In July 2005, the EU began a one-year civilian rule of
law mission to help train about 800 Iraqi police, judges, and administrators.  Training
is taking place primarily outside of Iraq because of ongoing security concerns.  The
EU will establish a small liaison office in Baghdad, and may consider future training
in Iraq if security conditions improve.  In September 2005, the EU established a
civilian mission in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, to monitor implementation of the new
peace agreement for the region; the EU-led mission in Banda Aceh is composed of
over 200 monitors from EU member states, Norway, Switzerland, and five Asian
countries.  In November 2005, the EU began deploying about 70 monitors to the
Rafah border crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt as part of an Israeli-
Palestinian agreement on security controls for Gaza following Israel’s recent
withdrawal.  In January 2006, the EU will also establish a small training and advisory
mission for Palestinian police forces.
In addition, the EU has become more involved in trying to promote security and
stability in its “wider European neighborhood.”  In July 2004, the EU set up a year-
long civilian rule of law mission in Georgia to support the judicial reform process.
An EU team in September 2005 began advising Georgian border guard forces to
promote reform and assess ways to help Georgia monitor its volatile border with
Russia.  Georgia continues to urge the EU to establish a formal monitoring operation
along the Russian-Georgian border to fill the void left by the end of the five-year
mission run by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
after Russia vetoed its extension in December 2004.  Some EU members, however,
are hesitant to undertake such a monitoring mission given Russia’s likely opposition.
In November 2005, the EU launched a border mission to Moldova and Ukraine, in
response to a joint request from those countries, to assist them in countering weapons
trafficking, organized crime, and corruption by providing advice and training to
Moldovan and Ukrainian border and custom authorities.38
The Future Shape of ESDP
European Viewpoints.  EU leaders view ESDP as one of the next great
projects on the road to European integration, and will likely seek to enhance ESDP
further over the next decade.  As noted above, most EU members assert that EU
efforts to boost defense capabilities should complement — not compete with —
those of the alliance.  The UK hopes that bringing more and better military hardware
to the table will give the European allies a bigger role in alliance decision-making.
Italy and Spain, among others, hope that ESDP’s military requirements will
eventually provide the necessary ammunition to pry more defense funding out of
reluctant legislatures and publics more concerned with social spending and struggling
economies.  Incoming EU member states from central and eastern Europe, such as
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Poland and the three Baltic states, back ESDP but maintain that it must not weaken
NATO or the transatlantic link.  The EU’s four neutral members (Austria, Finland,
Ireland, and Sweden) prefer to concentrate their efforts on ESDP’s civilian side.
Germany, given its size and wealth, is considered critical to the success of
ESDP, but has played a rather passive role in much of ESDP’s development.
Although always supportive of the initiative, Berlin was keen to tread carefully in
light of U.S. concerns.  However, some analysts suggest that Germany and other
states that opposed the U.S.-led war in Iraq may be increasingly receptive to French
efforts to forge a European defense arm independent of NATO.  They point to the
April 2003 meeting of French, German, Belgian, and Luxembourg leaders to discuss
creating a separate European military headquarters, planning staff, and armaments
agency.  Although not under EU auspices, this four-power meeting suggests that
France is still intent on slowly developing a more autonomous European defense
identity; whether Germany will support this position in the future remains an open
question.
Boosting Planning Capabilities.  As part of ongoing efforts to build ESDP,
the EU in  December 2003 adopted a new agreement on enhancing the EU’s military
planning capabilities.  This agreement represents a compromise negotiated by the
UK, France, and Germany.  It entails
! Establishing a British-proposed EU planning cell at NATO
headquarters (SHAPE) to help coordinate “Berlin Plus” missions, or
those EU missions conducted using NATO assets.
! Adding a new, small cell with the capacity for operational planning
to the existing EU Military Staff — which currently provides early
warning and strategic planning — to conduct possible EU missions
without recourse to NATO assets.
! Inviting NATO to station liaison officers at the EU Military Staff to
help ensure transparency and close coordination between NATO and
the EU.
Some observers criticize the British for agreeing to this deal, accusing UK Prime
Minister Blair of bowing to French demands for a more independent ESDP to help
burnish his European credentials following the rift with Paris and Berlin over Iraq.
UK officials are keen to point out that the deal considerably scales back the early
proposals in April 2003 for a separate European headquarters. They claim language
in the agreement reaffirms NATO as Europe’s preeminent security organization.
They stress that the new cell will “not be a standing headquarters,” and that national
headquarters will still remain the “main option” for running missions without NATO
assets, such as the French-commanded EU mission in the Congo.  UK officials likely
judged that if they had blocked this initiative, Paris and Berlin would have gone
ahead with some sort of European headquarters outside of the EU structure, which
would have been even more objectionable to UK and NATO interests.39
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Press reports indicate that the December 2003 deal to enhance the EU’s
planning capabilities was also linked to a compromise in the EU’s constitutional
treaty on two defense provisions that aim to further the development of a common
EU defense policy.  The UK had initially strongly opposed the French-German-
backed proposals in the treaty for a “mutual assistance clause,” and for “structured
cooperation” to permit a smaller group of member states to cooperate more closely
on military issues.  British (and U.S.) officials worried that the “mutual assistance
clause” would undermine NATO’s Article 5 defense guarantee, and that “structured
cooperation” could weaken EU solidarity as well as that of the alliance given the
large number of overlapping members.
The UK reportedly acquiesced on both of these defense provisions, however,
after securing some revisions.  The “mutual assistance clause” now includes stronger
language reiterating that NATO remains the foundation of collective defense for
those EU members that are also NATO allies.  “Structured cooperation” activities
have apparently been refocused mostly on efforts to boost military capabilities rather
than on conducting operations.  The constitutional treaty was signed in October 2004
but must be ratified by all 25 member states through either parliamentary approval
or public referenda.  Twelve states have completed ratification, but the constitution’s
future has been thrown into doubt following its rejection by French and Dutch voters
in separate referenda in May and June 2005.  EU leaders have reaffirmed their
commitment to the constitutional treaty but recognize that the initial ratification
deadline of November 2006 is no longer tenable.  Experts say the constitutional treaty
is effectively on hold until at least mid-2007, after the next French general election.40
The EU is currently working to implement its new civilian/military cell within
the EU’s Military Staff.  The EU reports that this cell is now fully staffed.  The cell
is expected to have the ability by mid-2006 to rapidly set up an operations center, as
needed, which would be capable of running an autonomous EU military operation on
the scale of the French-led EU operation in the Congo in 2003.  The EU is also
collaborating with NATO to establish the EU cell at SHAPE and to finalize the
arrangements for a NATO liaison team at the EU.
Enhancing Rapid Response Capabilities.  At the June 2004 EU summit
in Brussels, Belgium, EU leaders endorsed a new Headline Goal 2010 aimed at
further developing European military capabilities.  The Headline Goal 2010 is
focused on improving the interoperability, deployability, and sustainability of
member states’ armed forces.  A key element of the Headline Goal is the
“battlegroups concept,” which seeks to enhance the EU’s ability to respond rapidly
to emerging crises and undertake the full spectrum of Petersberg tasks.  The EU
envisions that each battlegroup will consist of about 1,500 high-readiness troops
capable of being deployed within 15 days, for up to 4 months, for either stand-alone
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missions or as a spearhead force to “prepare the ground” for a larger, follow-on
peacekeeping operation.  The conceptual model appears to be largely based on the
French-led EU mission to the Congo in 2003, which paved the way for a U.N.
peacekeeping force.  
In November 2004, at the EU’s third military capability commitment
conference, EU officials announced plans for the creation of 13 battlegroups, which
may be formed by one or more member states, and may also include non-EU
members.  The EU has established an initial operating capacity of being able to field
one battlegroup at a time for 2005 and 2006; by 2007, the EU says it will have the
capacity to field two battlegroup operations nearly simultaneously.  The EU has not
specified a geographic area in which these battlegroups might operate, but most
observers believe that trouble spots in Africa or the Balkans are the most probable
theaters for the battlegroups.
Many European and American military experts view the EU’s battlegroups as
more sustainable and practical than the EU’s 60,000-strong rapid reaction force.
They hope that the emphasis on highly trained, rapidly deployable multinational
formations indicate that the EU is growing more serious about enhancing its defense
capabilities and seeking new ways to stretch existing defense resources farther.  EU
officials stress that the battlegroup concept is intended to complement rather than
compete with the new NATO Response Force (NRF), and note that the EU and
NATO have already begun discussing ways to ensure that the battlegroups and the
NRF are mutually reinforcing.  Some analysts predict that the NRF will likely
undertake higher-intensity operations than the EU battlegroups in the near to medium
term.41
ESDP Post-September 11.  Following September 11, 2001, the EU
struggled with whether to expand ESDP’s purview to include combating external
terrorist threats or other new challenges, such as countering the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.  In June 2002, EU leaders agreed that the Union should
develop counter-terrorism force requirements, but stopped short of expanding the
Petersberg tasks.  Increasingly, however, EU member states appear to recognize that
ESDP must have a role in addressing new challenges in order to remain relevant and
to bolster the EU’s new, broader security strategy developed by the EU’s top foreign
policy official, Javier Solana.  The description of the Petersberg tasks in the text of
the EU’s new constitutional treaty states that “all of these tasks may contribute to the
fight against terrorism;” many analysts assert that this language effectively expands
the Petersberg tasks to include combating terrorism.
In the wake of the March 11, 2004 terrorist bombings in Spain, EU leaders
issued a new “Declaration on Combating Terrorism.”  Among other measures, it
called for “work to be rapidly pursued to develop the contribution of ESDP to the
fight against terrorism.”  In November 2004, EU officials outlined a more detailed
CRS-23
42 Javier Solana, “Intelligent War on Terrorism,” Korea Herald, Nov. 8, 2004.
43 Judy Dempsey, “EU Big Three in Deal over Defence,” Financial Times, Dec. 12, 2003;
Daniel Dombey, “NATO Defends Deal on Darfur Airlift,” Financial Times, June 10, 2005;
Interviews of U.S. and European officials.
plan to enhance EU military and civilian capabilities to prevent and protect both EU
forces and civilian populations from terrorist attacks, and to improve EU abilities to
manage the consequences of a terrorist attack.  EU policymakers also noted that
ESDP missions might include providing support to third countries in combating
terrorism.  At the same time, EU officials maintain that countering terrorism will not
be ESDP’s main focus, in part because they view the fight against terrorism largely
as an issue for law enforcement and political action.42
U.S. Perspectives
Successive U.S. Administrations, backed by Congress, have supported the EU’s
ESDP project as a means to improve European defense capabilities, thereby enabling
the allies to operate more effectively with U.S. forces and to shoulder a greater
degree of the security burden.  U.S. supporters argue that ESDP’s military
requirements are consistent with NATO efforts to enhance defense capabilities and
interoperability among member states.  They point out that the EU has made
relatively quick progress on its ESDP agenda, and its missions in the Balkans and in
the Congo demonstrate that the EU can contribute effectively to managing crises,
both within and outside of Europe.  As noted previously, U.S. policymakers and
Members of Congress insist that EU efforts to build a defense arm be tied to NATO.
The United States remains concerned, however, about possible NATO-EU
competition and worries that France and some other EU members will continue to
press for a more autonomous EU defense identity.  Washington grudgingly approved
the December 2003 agreement to enhance the EU’s planning capabilities, but some
U.S. officials still believe that the new EU planning cell of 20 to 30 officers could
grow over time into a larger staff, which could rival NATO structures.  They also
worry that if the EU’s constitutional treaty is eventually approved, the “mutual
assistance clause” and “structured cooperation” provisions in the treaty could
ultimately lead to a multi-tiered security structure that could destroy the indivisibility
of the transatlantic security guarantee.  Furthermore, some commentators contend
that NATO-EU rivalry needlessly delayed the mission launched in June 2005 to
support the African Union in Sudan.  They criticize the resulting deal, in which both
NATO and the EU are running parallel airlift missions coordinated by an African
Union-led cell in Ethiopia, as duplicative and inefficient.43
Overall, critics of ESDP contend that it will mean less influence for the United
States in Europe.  They suggest that the possible development within NATO of an
“EU caucus” — pre-negotiated, common EU positions — could complicate alliance
decision-making and decrease Washington’s leverage.  As noted previously, EU
plans for its rapid reaction force may depend on double- or triple-hatting forces
already assigned to NATO or other multinational units, thus potentially depriving
NATO of forces it might need if a larger crisis arose subsequent to an EU
deployment.  Furthermore, if EU missions overstretch European militaries, ESDP
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could compete with NATO efforts to develop its quick-strike Response Force,
impede the sustainability of NATO forces in Afghanistan, or hinder the deployment
of a possible NATO-led mission in Iraq.  Others fear that the EU’s success in
establishing defense decision-making bodies has not been matched by capability
improvements, potentially leading to a situation in which the EU gets bogged down
in a conflict and requires the United States and NATO to bail it out.
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